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Abstract Why is it that behaviors that rely on control, so
striking in their diversity and flexibility, are also subject to
such striking limitations? Typically, people cannot engage in
more than a few—and usually only a single—control-de-
manding task at a time. This limitation was a defining element
in the earliest conceptualizations of controlled processing; it
remains one of the most widely accepted axioms of cognitive
psychology, and is even the basis for some laws (e.g., against
the use of mobile devices while driving). Remarkably, how-
ever, the source of this limitation is still not understood. Here,
we examine one potential source of this limitation, in terms of
a trade-off between the flexibility and efficiency of represen-
tation (“multiplexing”) and the simultaneous engagement of
different processing pathways (“multitasking”). We show that
even a modest amount of multiplexing rapidly introduces
cross-talk among processing pathways, thereby constraining
the number that can be productively engaged at once. We
propose that, given the large number of advantages of efficient
coding, the human brain has favored this over the capacity for
multitasking of control-demanding processes.
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Introduction
The human ability for controlled processing is striking in its
power and flexibility, and yet equally striking in its limitations.
People are famously poor at multitasking control-demanding
behaviors; they are often able to execute only a few, and some-
times nomore than one at a time, and these limitations are central
to debates that have broad social significance (e.g., the use cell
phones while driving). Nevertheless, there is still little agreement
about the source of these limitations.
The limits in our ability to multitask control-demanding
behaviors have sometimes been taken to suggest that the
capacity for control itself is limited. Indeed, limited capacity
was a defining feature in the earliest conceptualizations of
controlled processing (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977), which asserted that controlled processing
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relies on a single, centralized, and capacity-limited general
purpose resource. Although early theories failed to specify the
nature of this resource, subsequent theories have been more
explicit about the mechanisms involved (e.g., Anderson, 1983;
Baddeley, 1986; Engle, 2002; Just & Carpenter, 1992)—for
example, linking the constraints on control to the long recog-
nized capacity limits of working memory (e.g., G.A. Miller,
1956; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006; Sternberg, 1966) and/or to the
constraints on centralized procedural resources needed to exe-
cute task-related processes (e.g., Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008).
However, these ideas risk stipulating rather than explaining the
limitation. Furthermore, the notion of a resource limitation is
startling, if one considers that control processes are known to
rely on the function of the prefrontal cortex, a structure that
occupies a major fraction of the human neocortex and com-
prises about three billion neurons (Herculano-Houzel 2009;
Pakkenberg & Gundersen, 1997; Thune, Uylings, &
Pakkenberg, 2001; Williams & Herrup, 1988). Thus, it seems
unlikely that a structural limitation alone can explain the con-
straints on multitasking. Though some have proposed that the
constraints reflect metabolic limitations (Muraven, Tice, &
Baumeister, 1998), this too seems unlikely, since other func-
tions, such as vision, routinely engage widespread regions of
neocortex in an intense and sustained manner.
Multitasking versus multiplexing
An alternative approach to understanding limitations in
control-dependent multitasking is to consider that these may
arise from functional (i.e., computational) rather than, or per-
haps in addition to, structural constraints. One important func-
tional constraint may be the problem presented by
multiplexing of representations—that is, the use of the same
representations for different purposes by multiple processes.1
This idea has its roots in early “multiple-resource” theories of
attention (Navon & Gopher, 1979; see also Allport, 1980;
Logan, 1985; Wickens, 1984). These argued that the degrada-
tion in behavior observed when people try to multitask may be
due to cross-talk within local processing resources specific to
the particular tasks involved, rather than to the constrained
resource of a single, centralized general-purpose control
mechanism (Baddeley, 1970; Posner & Snyder, 1975).
Cross-talk arises when two (or more) tasks make simultaneous
demands on the same processing or representational appara-
tus. Insofar as each is capable of supporting only a single
process or representation at a given time, these can be thought
of as limited-capacity “resources,” though multiple different
resources are assumed to support the various types of process-
es and representations of which the system is capable.
Accordingly, cross-talk can arise anywhere in the system
where two tasks make competing use of the same local re-
source(s). This, in turn, will interfere with multitasking.2
A classic example contrasts two dual-task conditions:
echoing an auditory stream while simultaneously typing visu-
ally presented text (copy-typing), versus simultaneously read-
ing aloud and taking dictation. The former pair is relatively
easy to learn, whereas the latter is considerably more difficult
(Shaffer, 1975). The multiple-resource explanation suggests
that echoing and copy-typing involve nonoverlapping repre-
sentations and processing pathways (one auditory–phonolog-
ical–verbal, the other visual–orthographic–manual). Because
they make use of distinct resources, there is no risk of cross-
talk, so it is possible to do both at once (see Fig. 1A). In
contrast, reading out loud and dictation make shared use of
both phonological and orthographic representations (see
Fig. 1B), and thus are subject to the problem of cross-talk:
The two tasks demand that different representations of a given
type be activated at the same time (e.g., the one to be read and
the other to be transcribed). Insofar as this is not possible (e.g.,
to simultaneously activate phonological representations cor-
responding to different stimuli), competition will arise that, if
not properly managed, will lead to interference and degrada-
tion of performance. Allport , Antonis, and Reynolds (1972)
summarized this clearly in one of the earliest articulations of
the multiple-resource (or “channels”) hypothesis:
In general, we suggest, any complex task will depend on
the operation of a number of independent, specialized
processors, many of which may be common to other
tasks. To the extent to which the same processors are
involved in any two particular tasks, truly simultaneous
performance of these two tasks will be impossible. On
the other hand, the same tasks paired, respectively with
another task requiring none of the same basic processors
can in principle be performed in parallel with the latter
without mutual interference. (p. 233)
The problem of mutual interference, or cross-talk, arises
due to the multiplexing of representations—that is, to the use
of the same representations for different purposes—for
1 The term “multiplexing” is often used in the context of signal process-
ing to refer to the simultaneous communication of two or more signals
over the same processing channel. Here, we use it in a broader sense, to
refer to the allocation of a single mechanism (or set of representations) to
a multiplicity of purposes.
2 Note that our focus here is on concurrent multitasking, sometimes
referred to as “perfect timesharing” or “pure parallel processing.” This
contrasts with forms of multitasking in which the processes associated
with the different tasks are interleaved, with only one process being
executed at a time under the control of a central processor and its
associated scheduler. Such multitasking may approximate concurrency
at a coarser level (as, for example, often occurs in computers). However,
the limits to performance are typically attributable to the centralized
processor and/or its scheduler, and not to direct interaction between the
tasks themselves (though, in some systems, bottlenecks can arise for
either reason; see, e.g., Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008).
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example, the use of phonological representations for both
encoding auditorily presented words and reading words out
loud. Presumably, multiplexing occurs in the brain because it
is efficient and affords flexibility. For example, we would not
want to have two sets of phonological representations, one for
listening and another for speaking, as well as additional ones
for echoing, singing, and so forth. Furthermore, multiplexing
allows representations that arise for one purpose to be put to
use for others, and can also support powerful forms of com-
putation, such as similarity-based inference (Forbus, Gentner,
& Law, 1995; Hinton, McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986).
Theories of “embodied” or “grounded” cognition (e.g.,
Barsalou, 2008) are based on similar arguments, proposing
that the same neural apparatus used for sensory–motor pro-
cesses is also used for more abstract forms of thought. In
support of this, neuroimaging studies have documented the
use of the specific parts of the visual system for both percep-
tion and imagery (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Alpert, 1997), and
the motor system for action execution, planning, and even
interpretation (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi,
2003; di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti,
1992; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goebel, Khorram-Sefat,
Muckli, Hacker, & Singer, 1998; Jeannerod, 1994).
As we noted above, however, multiplexing carries with it
the problem of cross-talk. Furthermore, this problem is not
limited to competition between instructed processes. It ex-
tends more generally to situations in which interference can
arise from competing habitual (or “automatic”) processes. In
general, it has been argued that a primary purpose of control is
the management of such cross-talk (e.g., Berlyne, 1957;
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Meyer &
Kieras, 1997), by restricting the number of competing pro-
cesses that are executed at once. Note, however, that accord-
ing to this account, limitations arise from cross-talk within
local, task-specific “resources” (e.g., phonological or visual
representations), rather than from the capacity constraint on a
single, centralized control resource (such as working memo-
ry). Indeed, from this perspective, control helps solve the
problem of cross-talk. However, its consistent engagement
under circumstances that involve cross-talk (and, therefore,
its close association with them) could engender the misinter-
pretation that control itself is fundamentally subject to (rather
than a solution for) capacity constraints on performance.
Debate is still ongoing about whether limits in the ability to
multitask are due to the capacity constraints of a centralized
control mechanism (perhaps even for the very same reasons
that they arise in more specialized mechanisms), or whether
they can be accounted for entirely in terms of the cross-talk
among task-specific mechanisms, and this debate has fueled
considerable computational modeling work (e.g., Meyer &
Kieras, 1997; Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008). However, both types
of account would seem to concur on two fundamental points
regarding the importance of cross-talk: (1) It represents a
critical factor in limiting multitasking (wherever it may occur),
and (2) the need to limit it drives the need for control in the first
place. Thus, achieving a deeper understanding of the relation-
ship between cross-talk, control, and multitasking is an impor-
tant goal, especially if general properties can be identified. The
work that we present here is an attempt to address this goal.
We conducted a quantitative examination of the influence
that multiplexing (and associated cross-talk) has on control
and multitasking. In striving for generality, we did this under a
simple and generic set of conditions: Each task involved a
direct set of mappings from input to output; cross-talk oc-
curred when tasks involved the same inputs or outputs; control
acted only to select tasks for execution; and no intrinsic
capacity constraints were placed on control. The last of these
conditions was meant to isolate the influence that multiplexing
Fig. 1 Multitasking and cross-talk: Schematic diagrams of the process-
ing pathways involved in two dual-task situations. Panel A shows the
pathways engaged by verbally repeating auditorily presented words
(echoing) and transcribing visually presented text (copy-typing). Since
the pathways carrying the information relevant to each task from input to
output do not overlap, there is no cross-talk, making it possible to carry
out both tasks simultaneously (i.e., to multitask). Panel B shows the
pathways engaged by typing auditorily presented words (dictation, blue
arrows in the online version) and reading text out loud (red arrows in the
online version). In this case, the pathways for the two tasks overlap; that
is, they make common use of the same sets of representations (e.g.,
phonological representations are needed for both encoding the words
for dictation and generating the responses for reading). Insofar as each
task may involve representing different specific information items of the
same type, the pathway overlap will produce cross-talk and interference,
making it difficult, if not impossible, to multitask
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had on multitasking, independent of any additional influence
that constraints on the capacity for control itself might have.
We used two different formalisms to implement these condi-
tions, and in each instance optimized the processing parame-
ters (including control) to maximize aggregate performance
over all tasks. We then examined the extent to which the
introduction of multiplexing impacted the number of tasks
that could be executed at once. Not surprisingly, we found
that the optimal number of tasks to carry out decreased as
multiplexing increased. Critically, however, this decrease was
precipitous and extreme, and was virtually unaffected by the
size of the system. This suggests the intriguing idea that the
presence of multiplexing—and the potential for cross-talk that
it introduces—not only poses a demand for control, but at the
same time imposes limits on the amount of control that should
be allocated. This, in turn, suggests that the extensive use of
multiplexed representations in the brain may provide at least
one normative source of constraint on the multitasking of
control-dependent processes.
In the sections that follow, we provide a brief review of
previous modeling work addressing the relationship between
cross-talk and control, which formed the basis for the present
work. We then describe extensions of this work, using two
models to quantify the relationship between multiplexing,
cross-talk, and limits in the multitasking of control-
dependent processes. Finally, we conclude with a discussion
of how our findings relate to other accounts of constraints on
the capacity for control-dependent processing, as well as of
promising directions for future work on this topic.
A simple model of controlled processing and cross-talk
We start with a model of the Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991;
Stroop, 1935). Although this task is not typically thought of in
the context of multitasking, it provides perhaps the simplest
example of the problem that multiplexing and cross-talk pres-
ent to multitasking, and it is one of the most intensively
studied examples of controlled processing. In this task, par-
ticipants are presented with a written word displayed in color
(e.g., GREEN presented in red) and are asked to name the
color in which it is displayed (e.g., to say “red”). This invari-
ably takes longer (and is more prone to error) than if they are
simply asked to read the word, or to name the color of a word
that refers to the same color (e.g., RED presented in red). The
traditional interpretation of these findings—which are among
the most robust in all of behavioral science—is that color
naming is a control-demanding process (slower, effortful,
and subject to interference), whereas word reading is automat-
ic (faster, effortless, and performed even in the absence of
control; Posner & Snyder, 1975). A more recent and nuanced
interpretation is that the demands for control are context
dependent, and in particular, dependent on the nature of any
competing tasks (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990;
Engle, 2002; Kahneman & Treisman, 1984). By all accounts,
however, when a task involves behavior that must compete
with other—more reflexive, habitual, or otherwise prepo-
tent—responses, then performance on the task will demand
the allocation of control in order to avert the cross-talk induced
by the more automatic process. Color naming in the Stroop
task provides a clear of example of this.
Cohen et al. (1990) described a neural-network model that
provided a mechanistic account for many of the findings ob-
served in the Stroop task. In that model (Fig. 2A), task perfor-
mance was simulated as the flow of activity between sets of
processing units that comprised pathways from stimuli to their
responses. Themodelwasmade up of two sets of input units: one
representing the orthographic form of the stimulus, and the other
its color. Each of these projected to a corresponding set of
associative (“hidden”) units that, in turn, converged on a set of
response units representing the verbal (phonological form of the)
response. Thus, Cohen et al. (1990) described two pathways: one
for word reading, composed of connections from the orthograph-
ic input units to their associative units and from them to the
verbal response layer, and one for color naming (from the color
inputs units, by way of their associative units, to the response
layer). Note that the response units served two purposes—read-
ing theword and naming the color of the stimulus. In this respect,
the representations in the response layer were multiplexed, and
thus constituted a limited “resource” for which the two pathways
competed.
To simulate the greater automaticity of word reading, the
connections along that pathway were stronger than those
along the color-naming pathway. As a consequence, when a
conflict stimulus was presented (e.g., GREEN presented in
red), the model responded to the word rather than the color,
much as participants do when they are presented with such
stimuli and provided only with the instruction to “respond”
(i.e., without specifying which task to perform). However,
when they are instructed to name the color, people can do
so. This is a clear example of the capacity for control—that is,
the ability to respond to the weaker dimension of a stimulus, in
the face of competition from a stronger, prepotent response.
Themodel explained this in terms of the “top-down” influence
of a set of control units used to represent the task to be
performed. Activating the color-naming task unit sent addi-
tional biasing activity to the associative units in the color
pathway, so that they were more responsive to their inputs
(see Cohen et al., 1990 or Cohen et al., 2004 for fuller
explanations of this effect). In this way, the model was able
to respond to the color of the stimulus, even in the face of
competition from the otherwise stronger word-reading path-
way. This illustrated a fundamental function of control: the
management of cross-talk in the service of task performance.
This model and similar ones have been used to account for
performance in a wide range of cognitive tasks that rely on
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control (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, in press; Braver & Cohen,
2000; Cohen et al., 1990; Liu, Holmes, & Cohen, 2008;
O’Reilly, Noelle, Braver, & Cohen, 2002; Rougier, Noelle,
Braver, Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005; Servan-Schreiber, Bruno,
Carter, & Cohen, 1998; Yu, Dayan & Cohen 2009) and for the
role of neural structures (such as the prefrontal cortex, basal
ganglia, and dopamine systems) in supporting this function
(Braver & Cohen, 2000; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly
& Frank, 2006). More specifically, such models have also direct-
ly addressed the role that control plays in managing cross-talk
(e.g., Botvinick et al. 2001; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013;
Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). However, their focus has
been on situations in which control is needed to manage cross-
talk from unintended processes, and not on situations in which
cross-talk arises from multitasking (i.e., from other intended
processes). Accordingly, the models have not directly addressed
limitations in the multitasking of control-dependent processes.
However, an important source of such limitations is implicit in
these models.
Cross-talk and limits on multitasking
Imagine an extension of the Stroop task in which a person is
asked not only to name the color of the word, but also to
respond to the word itself with some other action (e.g., press-
ing a different button for each word). Figure 2B shows an
elaboration of the Stroop model corresponding to this set of
tasks, in which the word units are now mapped to a set of
manual actions, in addition to verbal responses. Carrying out
both tasks simultaneously requires activating both the color
and word-reading units. Although in principle this is
possible—there are no intrinsic constraints in the model on
how many control units can be activated—the consequence is
that color naming will once again be subject to cross-talk from
the word. Attempting to perform these two tasks makes it clear
that it is almost (if not entirely) impossible to do them at the
same time, much like reading and dictation.3 The original
Stroop model shows how multiplexing presents a risk of
Fig. 2 Stroopmodel. (A) Original model of the Stroop task (Cohen et al.,
1990). The bottom units are used to represent stimuli along the two
dimensions (color and orthographic form). These pass activity to inter-
mediate (associative) units (middle layer) that, in turn, pass activity to
output units (top layer) that represent the possible verbal responses. The
activities of the intermediate units are modulated by the task demand
(control) units (upper right box) that represent each of the two possible
tasks (color naming and word reading). Some links between units (brown
in the online version) represent excitatory connections (positive weights);
other links represent inhibitory connections (negative weights; red in
online version); and thicker lines represent stronger connections. The
word-reading pathway has stronger connections than does the color-
naming pathway (presumably due to greater practice and/or more consis-
tent mapping), which implements the greater automaticity of this task. As
a result, in order to perform the color-naming task and respond correctly
to an incongruent stimulus (e.g., GREEN presented in red), the color-
naming control unit must be activated (see the text for explanation). In
this respect, color naming is a control-demanding task, relying on the
corresponding control unit to manage potential interference from cross-
talk produced by the word-reading pathway. (B) Extended model that
includes a pathway for the word–action task described in the text. Note
that multiplexing now takes place in both the verbal response layer and
the intermediate, word-processing layer. As a consequence of this, color-
naming and word–action tasks cannot be performed simultaneously
without the risk of cross-talk
b
3 Note that it may be possible to learn to do these tasks simultaneously.
However, this would presumably require the allocation of a new set of
intermediate units, dedicated to the mapping from words to actions, as
well as the associated control representations, and would come at the cost
of considerable practice, as well as reduced coding efficiency and the loss
of any other benefits that accrue from multiplexing (e.g., inference).
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cross-talk, and thus poses the need for control. This extension
shows that multiplexing can also impose a limit on the amount
of control that should be allocated at once.
In the original Stroop model, cross-talk occurred due
to multiplexing at the response layer, where the same verbal
responses are afforded to two potentially competing
processes—color naming and word reading. More generally,
however, such cross-talk can arise anywhere that there are
multiplexed representations (such as the associative units in
the extended Stroop model, or the examples of reading and
dictation described above). To the extent that multiplexing is
widespread, the potential for cross-talk and the corresponding
need for control will be high. At the same time, this may bring
with it constraints on the amount of control that should be
allocated. As an analogy, consider the problem faced in de-
signing a network of train tracks and then scheduling the
trains: Increasing the directness of connections between
sources and destinations necessarily increases the density of
tracks, and therefore the number of crossing points. Managing
these, in turn, requires limiting the number of trains that are
running at the same time, or carefully scheduling their transit
(e.g., by restricting the number of green lights that can be
simultaneously lit at crossing points). By analogy, dense over-
lap of representations in the brain (multiplexing) may be an
efficient way of encoding information (and serving other
functions, such as constraint satisfaction and inference);
however, this brings with it the potential for interference due
to cross-talk, and thus may restrict the number of control-
dependent processes that can safely be licensed at once, and
thereby limit multitasking.
The foregoing provides a qualitative account of why the
multiplexing of representations introduces the need for
control, and the concomitant constraints that it places on
multitasking. However, it does not provide a quantitative
account. For example, how severely does the presence of
multiplexing constrain multitasking, and to what extent are
these effects scale-invariant—that is, to what extent do they
depend on the size of the system? To address these ques-
tions, we constructed variants of the Stroop model that
allowed us to amplify the number of pathways, manipulate
the amount of multiplexing, and normatively evaluate the
number of pathways that could simultaneously be en-
gaged—that is, the limits of multitasking. We hypothesized
that introducing even modest amounts of multiplexing into
a network would dramatically constrain its ability to multi-
task, and that this effect would be largely insensitive to the
size of the network; that is, improvements in multitasking
ability would be limited, even with large increases in net-
work size. The latter case is important, given the striking
disparity between the large number of potential processing
pathways in the human brain, yet the severely restricted
number of control-demanding tasks that people can simul-
taneously perform.
Methods
We constructed two variants of the Stroop model that
extended it to simulate more than two pathways. These used
the same basic architecture, but different processing functions
and objective functions (in order to evaluate the influences of
cross-talk and control on performance). The first model (I/O
matching) used a simple linear mapping from inputs to out-
puts for each pathway, and the match between the output and a
specified target value as the objective function. The second
model (DD) used a drift diffusion process to simulate the
dynamics of processing in each pathway, and the reward rate
as the objective function. We present both models, in order to
establish the generality of our findings and extrapolate the
anticipated influence of critical factors (such as linearity of the
processing function) to a broader class of models.
In the section that follows, we describe the overall network
architecture that was common to both models, followed by the
processing characteristics and objective functions that were
specific to each. We then describe the procedures used to
optimize processing and control in each network, and to
evaluate the corresponding limits of multitasking. Finally,
we describe the three factors that wemanipulated to determine
the influence of multiplexing on the limits of multitasking.
Network architecture
Pathways
Figure 3 shows the overall network architecture used for both
models. For simplicity (and analytic tractability, in the case of
the DD model), we restricted these pathways to simulating
simple two-alternative forced choice tasks. All of the units in
the models used linear processing functions (relating their
input to their output), and the models were composed of only
input and output layers. We refer to the projections from each
pair of input units to a pair of output units as a pathway P, with
each pathway implementing the input–output mapping corre-
sponding to a different task. Within each pathway, each input
unit of the pair was connected to one of the output units in the
corresponding pair with a weight of .5, and the other output
unit with a weight of –.5 (these specific values, and those for
the activity of the input units described below, were used to
simplify the mathematical analysis—see SOM A for details).
Thus, all weights were symmetric within a pathway, and their
magnitudes were equal across all pathways. The weights of
connections between input units and output units that did not
form a pathway were set to 0.
For the purposes of analysis, we focused on a subset of
pathways relevant to the tasks to be performed (Prel)—that is,
the tasks desired to be multitasked. We denote the number of
relevant pathways by N. In Fig. 3, these are illustrated as the
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pathways that connect a pair of input units to the immediately
overlying pair of output units. The remaining pathways (Pirrel,
shown as crossed pathways in Fig. 3) implemented
multiplexing in the model—that is, the assumption that other,
overlapping input–output mappings subserve tasks that are
useful in other contexts but are irrelevant in the present
one—and therefore introduced the potential for cross-talk.
Two factors determined the extent of this cross-talk: the prev-
alence of pathway overlap (multiplexing) and whether inputs
to overlapping pathways were likely to generate the same or
different (and therefore interfering) responses. We discuss
these factors below, in the Network Configuration section.
Control
Each pathway in the network was subject to control. As in the
Stroop model, this was implemented by a dedicated unit that
modulated the flow of activity from the input to the output
units. Thus, N control units were assumed, the activities of
which were defined by a vector κ = (k1, k2, . . . , kN). In the
Stroop model, control signals were implemented as a bias
added to the input of the associative units in the corresponding
pathway. Because units in that model used nonlinear
(sigmoidal) processing functions, the bias had the effect of
modulating the gain of those units (Cohen et al., 1990).
However, units in the present model used linear processing
functions, so we implemented modulation as a direct multi-
plicative effect. Specifically, the control signal ki for a given
pathway multiplied the activity of the units in that pathway.
The values of kwere bounded by 1 (ki∈ [0, 1]), paralleling the
bounded effects of control in the case of nonlinear units (i.e.,
bounds on the derivative of the sigmoidal function).
Furthermore, control was applied to both the input and output
units in each relevant pathway, in accord with the idea
that these implemented the input–output mapping corre-
sponding to the task to be controlled.4 Finally, it should
be noted that no intrinsic constraints were placed on the
number of control units that could be activated at a given
time. This was determined exclusively by procedures that
optimized the overall performance of the network, as we
describe below.
Processing
I/O-matching model This model implemented a simple,
single-pass, feed-forward network composed of linear output
units. On each trial, one unit for each pair of input units in a
pathway was assigned an activity value i of .5, and the other a
value of –.5 (these can be thought of as corresponding to the
net input to the intermediate units in the Stroop model in
Fig. 2A; Cohen et al., 1990). For simplicity in evaluating the
effects of cross-talk (discussed under Network Configuration
below), and without loss of generality, the leftmost
input unit was always assigned a value of .5 and the
rightmost unit –.5. The activity of each output unit was
then computed as the sum of all of the inputs connected
to it, scaled by both the connection weight and each
pathway’s control value. For example, the activity of the
qth relevant pathway’s left output unit (indexed as “1,”
where the right unit was indexed as “2”) was
Yq1¼
X
p∈Pq
kp wp1ip1þwp2ip2
 
; ð1Þ
where the sum is over all connected pathways to the qth pair of
output units, [ip1, ip2] is the activity of the left and right input
units of the pathway p, [wp1, wp2] are the weights of the
corresponding connections (as described above), and kp is
the value of control for the pathway that includes these units.
For the purposes of the objective function (see below), we
constrained the activity of all output units to remain in the
range [−1, +1]. We did this by further multiplying all weights
wj by 1/R, where R was the total number of projections
4 The same assumptionwas implicit in the Stroopmodel. Although in that
model the control (task demand) units projected only to the associative
units, the response units were also assumed to be subject to some form of
modulation (e.g., see Simulation 6 and Fig. 2B in Cohen et al., 1990).
Fig. 3 Network architecture. The example shows a network with four
pairs of input and output units (N=4), with overlapping pathways (F=1)
and the level of incongruence used in most simulations (ϕ=.75). Pairs of
input units connected to directly overlying pairs of output units (i.e., those
contained within the same dark-dotted box) constitute relevant path-
ways—that is, those to be multitasked. Connections between pairs of
input and output units in different boxes (shown in lighter colors) repre-
sent irrelevant pathways. Some connections have positive, and others
negative, weights, colored as in Fig. 2. Connections between pairs of
input and output units that have weights of the same sign are congruent,
and those having opposite signs are incongruent (see note 6 for an
explanation). Control units are shown in the upper right box. Their
connections to the corresponding pathways are also shown in darker
color, indicating that they have a multiplicative effect on the activity of
the input and output units in those pathways (see the text for an
explanation)
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received by each output unit (R = F + 1, where F was the
parameter that determined the degree of pathway
overlap—see the Pathway Overlap section below).
The “task” to be performed by each pathway in the Prel
set was simply for the output units in that pathway to
match the activity of the corresponding input units.
Accordingly, the performance criterion (i.e., objective
function) used for this model was the sum of the squared
differences between each input–output pair, divided by
the number of pathways in the Prel set—that is, the mean
squared error (MSE) of the output vector as compared to
the input vector. However, in order to account for control
on the output units, a subtle but important consideration
also had to be taken into account: the influence of path-
ways assigned low control values. As we will discuss
below, optimization procedures reduced control to path-
ways that were subject to cross-talk, in order to diminish
their deleterious contribution to network performance.
However, if left unchecked, the outputs of a fully
inactivated pathway might still be heavily influenced by
cross-talk from irrelevant pathways. To properly account
for this, we scaled the values of the output units (as
well as the input units) by the corresponding control
value, so that the scaled activity modifying Eq. 1 above
was Y q2 ¼ kqY q2 . These scaled outputs are what were
matched to the inputs in the objective function (see
SOM A for details). In this way, control influences both
the outputs and inputs in a relevant pathway. Note that as
constructed, the objective function favors allocating con-
trol to (i.e., activating) as many pathways as possible (i.e.,
maximizing multitasking), while weighing this against the
costs to performance of any interference introduced by
cross-talk.
DD model This model used the same network architecture as
the I/O-matching model. However, the activity of the output
units was determined by simulating the dynamics of informa-
tion accumulation using a drift diffusion process (Ratcliff,
1978; Ratcliff, Van Zandt, & McKoon, 1999) for each path-
way. Drift diffusion processes have been used widely to
simulate performance in two alternative forced choice deci-
sion tasks (Balci et al., 2011; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Simen
et al., 2009), and have been shown to provide a good approx-
imation of underlying neural processes (Gold & Shadlen,
2007; Schall, 2001; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Usher &
McClelland, 2001). Furthermore, they have the advantage of
being tractable to analysis, and thus can be parameterized for
optimal performance (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, &
Cohen, 2006; we will return to this below). Here, we extended
the standard implementation of a DD model to include multi-
ple overlapping processes. Thus, the activity of each output
unit was a linear combination of its inputs, as in Eq. 1.
However, in this case, the difference in activity between the
two output units in a pathway then served as the drift rate for a
DD process, and a response was made when this crossed a
specified threshold.5 The drift rate was modulated not only by
activity of the input units and the value of the control param-
eter kp for that pathway (i.e., for pathways in the Prel set), but
also by the input received from, and control parameters for,
overlapping pathways (i.e., in the Pirrel set; see Fig. 3 and
SOM A for details).
To insure that performance was sampled over as representa-
tive a range of input conditions as possible, the activity of each
input unit on each trial was drawn from a uniform distribution of
values between 0 and 1. This contrasted with the I/O-matching
model, in which inputs were either .5 or –.5. For the DDmodel,
it was important to sample inputs of varying strengths since the
performance criterion used for this model (reward rate—see
below) depended non-linearly on drift rate (and therefore
input activity; see Bogacz et al., 2006). For completeness, in
addition to the uniform distribution, we also examined other
distributions of input values and obtained similar results (see
SOM B). As in the I/O-matching model, greater activity was
always assigned to the left versus right input unit in each pair.
In accord with prior optimality analyses of DD processes
(e.g., Bogacz et al., 2006), we used reward rate as the objective
function for this model (see SOM A). Specifically, we opti-
mized the response threshold for the DD process implemented
by each pathway for the conditions of each trial (see the
Optimization section, below), so as to maximize its reward
rate on that trial. Then, paralleling the I/O-matching model, we
scaled the reward rate for each pathway by its corresponding
level of control. Finally we summed the scaled reward rates for
each pathway to obtain a reward rate for the entire network:
RR ¼
X
p¼1
N
kpRRp; ð2Þ
Here, RRp denotes the reward rate for each pathway. Thus,
each term in the sum of Eq. 2 represents the pth pathway’s
reward rate,scaled by its control policy κ, and the sum is taken
over all pathways. As with the I/O-matching model, the ob-
jective function favored allocating control to as many path-
ways as possible (maximizing multitasking), subject to the
constraint that doing so did not degrade performance (and
thereby decrease reward rate).
Optimization of performance and control policy
For each of the two models described above, we sought to
identify the optimal allocation of control over the pathways in
5 This is very similar to the implementation of the response mechanism in
the Stroop model (Cohen et al., 1990). Although that model used nonlin-
ear processing units, the response was determined by a linear combination
of the activity of the output units, which implemented a drift diffusion
process.
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the Prel set (i.e., how much multitasking could be supported).
We examined how this was influenced by pathway overlap
(that is, the degree of multiplexing in the network). As we
described above, the objective function for both models fa-
vored allocation of control to as many pathways as possible
(while remaining sensitive to any degradation in performance
introduced by cross-talk). This insured that our analyses fa-
vored multitasking as much as possible, and therefore that
estimates of the limitations in this ability were as conservative
as possible.
In order to further insure that optimization of control
policy favored multitasking as much as possible, we need-
ed to be sure that processing in each pathway in the Prel
set was optimized for each trial, given the inputs and
allocation of control on that trial. This was not a problem
for the I/O-matching model, since the outputs were a
simple linear sum of the inputs modulated by control.
However, insuring optimal performance for the DD model
required an additional step, since its performance
depended not only on the inputs and control for each
pathway, but also on the response thresholds. As described
in Bogacz et al. (2006), in the DD model a single re-
sponse threshold optimizes performance for a given drift
rate (determined, in our model, by the inputs and control
in a pathway). Thus, to insure that performance was
optimized for the current control policy, it was necessary
to optimize the threshold in each pathway for the inputs
and amount of control allocated to it. We did this using
the analyses reported in Bogacz et al. (2006).
Specifically, we used the following iterative proce-
dure to identify the optimal control policy for a given
network architecture. First, we sampled a set of inputs
and arbitrarily chose a level of control for each pathway
in the Prel set. For the I/O-matching model, we then
computed the outputs and evaluated the objective func-
tion (see Eq. S1 in SOM A). For the DD model, we
identified the optimal response threshold for each path-
way on the basis of its inputs and allocation of control,
and then analytically computed the resulting reward
rates for each output unit’s DD process using equations
in Bogacz et al. (2006). For both models, we then used
parallelized optimization software to iteratively sample
control policies, and identify the one that corresponded
to a global maximum of the corresponding objective
functions (see SOM C for details). In the results pre-
sented below, each point was obtained by solving the
relevant optimization problem 10,000 times.
Evaluation of limits on multitasking
The purpose of the procedures described above were to deter-
mine, for a given network configuration, the optimal control
policy for that configuration. We then identified the degree of
multitasking that this afforded. That is, our primary goal was
to determine, under the optimal control policy for a given
network configuration, how many pathways were allocated
sufficient control to support task performance. Toward this
end, we considered all pathways as active that were assigned a
level of control of kp ≥ .5 for a given control policy, and
denoted the number of such pathways as K. We selected .5
as the threshold for considering a pathway active on the basis
of simulations using a wide range of parameter values and
network configurations. For the I/O-matching model, this
threshold corresponded to ~75 % match of its output to its
input. For the DDmodel, it corresponded to harvesting ~72 %
of maximal possible reward rate along a pathway. The number
of active pathways K, defined in this way, provided an index
of the limits onmultitasking, with a smaller number indicating
more severe limitation.
Network configuration
Using the procedures described above, we conducted simula-
tions to examine how three factors determining network con-
figuration impacted the limits on multitasking (as defined
above): degree of pathway overlap (multiplexing), the extent
to which this produced cross-talk (interference), and network
size.
Pathway overlap (F) As we described under the Network
Architecture section, each pair of input units projected
to at least one pair of output units that comprised its
pathway in the Prel set. In addition, it could also project
to other pairs of output units, constituting pathways in
the Pirrel set. The number of such pathways was deter-
mined by a parameter F (for “fan-out”). This specified
the number of output unit pairs to which pairs of input
units projected (beyond the one in the Prel set), and could
range from 0 (no “fan-out” connections) to N − 1 (con-
nected to all output unit pairs). Thus, F determined the
amount of pathway overlap in the network, and conse-
quently the amount of multiplexing. It is intuitively obvi-
ous that for F = 0 full multitasking is optimal, because
there is no opportunity for cross-talk. What was of interest
was how increasing F interacted with other network factors
to influence the limits on multitasking. In determining
irrelevant pathways, we simply assigned each input unit
pair F random output unit pairs, making sure not to doubly
connect the same input unit to an output unit. We also tried
various other schemes for connecting inputs to outputs
(such as nearest neighbor connections), all of which did
not produce noticeably different results (see SOM B for
details). In the analyses below, we considered the effects of
pathway overlap both with respect to its absolute value (as
described above), and with respect to its value as a pro-
portion of network size, F/N.
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Incongruence (ϕ) Increasing pathway overlap increased
multiplexing, and therefore the potential for cross-talk in the
network. In principle, such cross-talk could either enhance or
degrade multitasking performance, depending upon whether
information arriving at a pair of output units from the irrele-
vant pathway(s) was congruent with information arriving
along the relevant pathway, and therefore facilitated process-
ing, or was incongruent and therefore interfered with process-
ing. This was determined by a parameter ϕ that specified the
frequency with which processing along irrelevant pathways
was congruent versus incongruent with processing along the
relevant pathways.6 This ranged from 0 (full congruency; i.e.,
activated inputs units in irrelevant pathways all had connec-
tion weights to the output units with the same sign as the
activated unit in the relevant one) to 1 (full incongruency).
Intuitively it is clear that for ϕ = 0 full multitasking will be
optimal, whereas as for ϕ= 1 multitasking will be deleterious.
What was of interest was how intermediate values of ϕ
interacted with other network factors to influence the limits
on multitasking.
Network size (N) Although it is clear that increasing pathway
overlap together with incongruence in our models would limit
multitasking, what was not clear was how restrictive this effect
would be, nor how it would scale with network size (i.e., the
number of relevant pathways). The latter is particularly im-
portant, given the large number of potential pathways in the
human brain. For example, if the effects of pathway overlap
and/or interference scaled linearly with network size
(enforcing a limit of some fixed percentage of available path-
ways), this would provide a poor explanation for the remark-
ably constrained ability that is observed in humans for multi-
tasking involving controlled-processing (i.e., even a small
percentage of a very large number is also a large number).
Rather, these effects would need to exhibit dramatically sub-
linear scaling to explain the striking disparity between the size
of the human brain and its limited ability to multitask using
controlled processing. To test for this, we simulated networks
ranging in size from N= 10 to 1,000 pathways, evaluating the
influence of pathway overlap and interference on the limits of
multitasking at each scale.
Results
Figure 4 shows the performance of the I/O-matching and DD
models for different levels of interference ϕ and a value of
pathway overlap of F= 20 % (i.e., F= N/5). We only consider
cases in which ϕ > .5, since this is the range in which the
irrelevant pathways cause interference.
As expected, increasing incongruence increased the
limits on multitasking, as is evidenced by a reduction in
the number of active pathways K. Under maximal inter-
ference ϕ = 1, even as the network size increased well
beyond 10 pathways, K converged to a value of around 10
in both models. In the DD model, asymptotic convergence
seems to occur around a value of ϕ = .75. At that level of
incongruence, even in the I/O-matching model the number
of active control representations grew very slowly with
network size, with only 17 active control representations
in a network of size 100, and only three more with a
tenfold increase in network size (to N = 1,000). On the
basis of these observations, we use a fixed value of
interference of ϕ = .75 in our subsequent simulations
examining the effects of pathway overlap.
Interpreting the empirical significance of the interference
parameter value is, of course, difficult. However, it does
not seem unreasonable to assume, for performance of a
task focused on a particular dimension of information,
that information from other, irrelevant dimensions is
distracting 75 % of the time. Indeed, it seems possible that
this is an underestimate, given that our models focus on
tasks involving only two choices; that is, in which the
probability of incongruence by chance is 50 %. As the
number of choices increases, the likelihood of incongruence
by chance increases quickly. These considerations, coupled
with the observation that this is the lowest value at which the
effects of performance approach asymptote, suggest that
ϕ = .75 is a reasonable (and perhaps conservative) point of
reference.
Figure 5 shows how multitasking in the I/O-matching
model is affected by pathway overlap (F) in networks of
various sizes. The effects are shown both in terms of absolute
values ofFandK, and when these are expressed as fractions of
network size N. As anticipated, increasing F quickly reduces
K; that is, it increased the limits on multitasking. However,
there are two important features of this effect: First, it is highly
nonlinear, with even modest amounts of pathway overlap
(e.g., a value of F = 20 %, upper right panel) producing a
considerable reduction in the number of tasks that can be
supported. Furthermore, this effect accelerates with network
size. That is, there is substantial sublinearity, so that the strong
constraint on the degree of multitasking—in terms of the
absolute number of tasks that can be performed—is only
minimally influenced by network size. For example, as men-
tioned above, even for a network with 1,000 pathways, pathway
6 Specifically, processing was congruent for two overlapping pathways if
the signs of the connection weights from the most highly activated input
units in the two pathways to the shared output unit were the same. Since
the convention, in bothmodels, was for the left input unit in each pathway
to receive greater activity than the one on the right, congruency could be
manipulated by varying the frequency with which connections from the
left and right input units in the irrelevant pathways had the same sign as
(i.e., were “parallel” to) connections from the left and right input units in
the relevant pathway, or conversely had the opposite sign (i.e., were
“crossed”). This was controlled byϕ. In Fig. 3, incongruence is illustrated
by the connections of the irrelevant pathways (in a slightly lighter shade)
having colors opposite those of the corresponding connections in the
relevant pathways.
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overlap of 20 % limits the amount of multitasking to below 30
pathways.
As with , it is difficult to relate F directly to a comparable
quantity in the brain. However, a value of 20 % seems rea-
sonable, if not modest, given the high degree of convergence
for pathways in the brain. For example, using two publicly
available large-scale cortical connectivity data sets (Rubinov
& Sporns, 2010), compiled from tract-tracing studies in the
macaque brain (in which nodes represent cortical areas and
links represent large corticocortical tracts), yields convergence
estimates of 15 % (using data from Young, 1993) and 23 %
(using data from Sporns, Honey, & Kötter, 2007). It is also
worth noting, again, that our analyses using the I/O-matching
model provide what is likely to be a lower bound on the effect
of pathway overlap and interference on multitasking. The
results for the DD model support this conjecture.
Figure 6 shows results for the DD model analogous to
those shown in Fig. 5 for the I/O-matching model. As a
comparison of these results makes clear, the DD model ex-
hibits effects similar to those of the I/O-matching model, only
in accentuated form. For example, for network size N = 1,000
and F = 20 %, multitasking was limited to less than 14 active
pathways, considerably below the level for the comparable
network in the I/O-matching model. Figure 7 summarizes
these effects, showing how the ability for multitasking chang-
es with network size (for F = 20 %), with the DD model
exhibiting a lower slope and approaching a substantially lower
asymptotic value than the I/O-matching model. In the General
Discussion, we consider factors that may explain these differ-
ences, and others that may further accentuate the effects of
multiplexing on multitasking.
Several important questions could be asked about these
results. A first question is: How sensitive was performance
to the optimal value ofK? For example, increasing the number
of active control units beyond this value could be associated
with only small costs to performance, calling into question the
importance of this limit for multitasking. To examine this, we
tested performance using values of K above and below the
optimal value in both the I/O-matching and DD models. The
results (shown in SOM D, Fig. S5) confirmed that, in both
cases, maximum performance was achieved for the value of K
identified as optimal (validating the optimization procedures),
and that even small deviations from this value were associated
with considerable decrements in performance. We also ob-
served that increasing the number of active control units was
more detrimental than decreasing that number, indicating that
a conservative policy should favor limiting rather than licens-
ing multitasking.
A second question is, How sensitive are these effects to the
objective function used to determine the optimal control pol-
icy? This is perhaps less relevant to the DD model, for which
the objective function—reward rate—both has face validity
and has been used extensively in other theoretical work on the
DD model (Balci et al., 2011; Bogacz et al., 2006; Simen,
Cohen, & Holmes, 2006). Thus, we focused our attention on
the I/O-matching model. In SOM D, we report results using a
simpler objective function (sum of absolute errors; see
Fig. S5, panel C) and show that these results do not differ
qualitatively from those reported above.
Finally, it is reasonable to ask why the limits in multitask-
ing that we observed were “hard”; that is, why scaling the
optimal value of K with network size was so severely
sublinear. It is difficult to give a precise answer to this ques-
tion, since the high dimensionality of the system, coupled with
the nonlinearities of the objective function, made it intractable
to closed-form analysis (hence, the need for simulations).
However, in SOM E, we report additional simulations using
the I/O-matching model that provide some insight into the
BA
Fig. 4 Capacity constraints as a function of incongruence for networks of
different sizes. The plots show the numbers of pathways active (k > 0.5;
see the text for explanation) under the optimal control policy for different
levels of incongruence (ϕ, along the x-axis) and networks of different
sizes (N; different colored lines). All results are for a pathway overlap of
F= 20% (i.e., F = N/5). Due to the computational demands of our model,
we were only able to simulate networks of size 1,000 for ϕ = .75, F =
20%. (A) I/O-matchingmodel. Note the steeper slope of decline for larger
networks, with convergence (at the highest levels of incongruence) to a
value of about ten active pathways, irrespective of network size. Even at
ϕ = .75 (the value used for most simulations), the number of pathways
that can simultaneously be engaged increases only by a factor of 3 for an
increase in network size of a factor of 100 (K = 7 for N = 10; K = 23 for
N = 1,000). (B) DD model. The I/O-matching effects are substantially
accentuated for the DDmodel, with near convergence for networks of all
sizes at ϕ = .75
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source of these effects. They suggest that, whereas modulation
of the entire pathway (i.e., both the input and output layers)
produces optimal performance, the sublinear scaling of
optimal K with network size relies heavily on control at the
output layer (see SOME, Figs. S6–S9). Some intuition for this
effect can be gained by considering the extended version of
the Stroop task described in the introduction. Presented with
the options of performing both the color-naming and
word–action tasks or just one of these, it would almost
certainly be preferable to choose the latter. Assume, for the
purposes of illustration, that the word–action task is chosen. In
this case, the full model would modulate the activity of both
the intermediate and response (output) units of the
color-naming pathway, leaving only the word–action pathway
activated (see Fig. 2B). However, now suppose that it were not
possible to modulate the output units in a pathway. This would
fail to suppress the effect of the intermediate units in the word
pathway on the verbal response units, which (for incongruent
stimuli) would produce an error in the color-naming task
(since the inputs to those units from the intermediate units in
the color pathway were suppressed). Therefore, under these
conditions, it would be preferable to also allocate control to
the color-naming pathway, allowing its input and interme-
diate units to influence the response, and at least partially
counteract the effects of the cross-talk at the output layer. In
other words, in the absence of the ability to control the
output, activating pathways that are subject to some (but
perhaps not too much) cross-talk can contribute beneficially
to their own outputs, and in some cases outweigh the cost of
any additional cross-talk that they introduce into the network.
However, when output can be controlled, this is not necessary,
and the optimal policy is to limit processing to only the best-
performing pathways.
General discussion
The simulations reported above provide a quantitative
examination of the effects of pathway overlap on the number
of tasks that can be simultaneously performed by networks
with the capability of performing multiple two-alternative
forced choice decision tasks. The results reveal that increasing
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Fig. 5 Capacity constraints in the I/O-matching model as a function of
pathway overlap for networks of different sizes. These results are for an
incongruence of = .75. The top panels (A and B) show capacity
constraints under the optimal control policy in terms of the absolute
number of active pathways (K), and the bottom panels (C and D) show
the results in terms of the percentage of active pathways (K/N). The left
panels (A and C) show the results in terms of the absolute amount of
pathway overlap (F), and the right panels (BandD) show them in terms of
the percentage of pathway overlap (F/N). Note that when there is no
overlap (F = 0), all relevant pathways are active (K = N), indicating
full multitasking. Increasing F quickly drives this down, limiting multi-
tasking. This effect is substantially greater for larger network sizes, with
networks of all sizes converging to a similar limit in multitasking at
around F = 20 %
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overlap rapidly constrains the number of tasks that can be
performed at once, and that this reaches a maximum in a
manner that is only weakly influenced by network size.
These findings support the idea that multiplexing of represen-
tations in the brain may be an important source of limits in the
ability for multitasking of control-dependent tasks. That said,
the upper limits on multitasking observed in the models (10–
30 tasks for a wide range of parameters) are noticeably higher
than those typically observed for humans (certainly under 10).
This may be due to a number of factors.
One factor is suggested by the difference in results ob-
served for the I/O-matching and DD models. The limits on
multitasking were less severe in the simpler, fully linear I/O-
matching model than for the DD model. Two primary differ-
ences in the latter model were the addition of an integration
process and the added nonlinearity that this introduced in the
relationship between processing and performance.
Presumably, the integration process afforded an additional
opportunity for cross-talk from irrelevant pathways to inter-
fere with processing in the relevant ones. The nonlinearity
may also have contributed to this effect. The inclusion of
additional nonlinearities commonly used in neural-network
models (e.g., in the processing function itself) could be ex-
pected to further accentuate it (e.g., by amplifying the influ-
ence of activation in irrelevant pathways on relevant ones).
Other factors that are likely to have a similar effect are mul-
tiple choices (increasing the likelihood of incongruence
among processes), recurrent connectivity (increasing interac-
tion among processes), more complex processes involving
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Fig. 7 Capacity constraints as a function of network size. The optimal
control policy is plotted for networks of varying size (N=10 to 1,000) for
the I/O-matching (top curve) and DD models (bottom curve). These
results are for a pathway overlap of F = 20 % and incongruence of ϕ =
.75. Note that the slopes of both lines reduce considerably as network size
increases, with the slope for the DD model decreasing more quickly and
reaching a lower value than the slope for the I/O-matching model. See the
text for a discussion. (Note that the change in slope from N = 10 to 30 is
due to a disproportionately high number of active connections for small
networks—about 50% of the units in the smallest network are active; this
small effect vanishes as N exceeds 30.)
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Fig. 6 Capacity constraints in the DD model as a function of pathway
overlap for networks of different sizes. See the Fig. 5 caption for details.
As in Fig. 4, the effects are substantially more pronounced than in the I/O-
matching model, with a striking convergence in the limit on multitasking
to less than 14 active pathways for a level of pathway overlap ofF= 20%,
irrespective of network size
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multiple levels of representation (increasing the opportunities
for pathway overlap—such as the reading/dictation example
in the introduction), asymmetric pathway strengths (possibly
increasing reliance on control, as in the Stroop task), and
distributed representations (contributing directly to
multiplexing). None of these were implemented in the present
models, but all of them are common features of real-world
tasks and neural systems. The combined effect of these factors
is likely to substantially potentiate the constraining effects of
pathway overlap on the ability to carry out multiple simulta-
neous processes. Of course, additional work will be needed to
determine whether and how these add to the constraints on
multitasking. It is important to emphasize, however, that none
of these factors alone would constrain multitasking in the
absence of pathway overlap—that is, in the absence of
multiplexing. In this respect, multiplexing can be viewed as
a primary causal factor, with which these others may interact.
Our models suggest that multiplexing can impose strict
limits on multitasking of control-dependent processes, with-
out any recourse to limitations in the control system itself.
That is, we imposed no intrinsic limitation on the number of
control units that could be activated at once, nor did their
engagement carry any direct costs or penalties—only those
associated with the consequences on performance. Of course,
introspection, traditional dogma (e.g., Posner & Snyder,
1975), and recent experimental findings (Dixon & Christoff,
2012; Kool & Botvinick, 2012; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, &
Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013) all
suggest that the exertion of control doescarry an intrinsic cost,
in the form of “mental effort.” An intriguing explanation for
this may be that such costs, experienced as subjective disutil-
ity, reflect intrinsic biases limiting the engagement of control
signals in order to minimize the risk of cross-task.
Although our work focused on the role of multiplexing in
limiting multitasking, it does not preclude—and may comple-
ment—models that address potential constraints on the capac-
ity of control mechanisms themselves. The existence of such
constraints has consistently been suggested by one remarkably
robust phenomenon—the psychological refractory period
(PRP; Welford, 1952). This refers to the observation of a
seemingly immutable cost associated with performing more
than one control-demanding task at once, as compared to
performing them each individually. The PRP has been offered
as evidence that the capacity constraints of a centralized
control mechanism impose a “central bottleneck” that pro-
hibits truly concurrent multitasking, requiring instead that
control-demanding tasks be carried out in sequence (e.g.,
Pashler, 1984). However, more recent accounts suggest that
these effects may reflect the influence of task instructions
rather than a central bottleneck (e.g., Howes, Lewis, & Vera,
2009; Schumacher et al., 2001). Nevertheless, several theories
continue to propose that multitasking and control may rely on
a centralized mechanism, and neuroscientific evidence has
been martialed in support of this claim (Duncan & Owen,
2000; Roca et al., 2011; Tombu et al., 2011).
One influential class of theories has used production sys-
tem architectures to develop computationally explicit models
of multitasking performance. Traditionally, these have
exploited a fundamental feature of this architecture—reliance
on goal representations in declarative memory for the execu-
tion of control-demanding behavior—to explain constraints
on multitasking (e.g., Byrne & Anderson, 2001). Using this
framework, more recent threaded-cognition models have pro-
posed that bottlenecks can exist both in the central mecha-
nisms responsible for control (such as declarative memory)
and in peripheral modules responsible for task-specific pro-
cesses, and that constraints on multitasking can arise from
either or both, depending on the specific characteristics of the
tasks involved (e.g., Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008). However,
even these models assume that the execution of all tasks relies
on coordination by a common, serial procedural resource.
Thus, whereas these models have produced remarkably de-
tailed accounts of human multitasking performance in a vari-
ety of tasks, they risk stipulating (in the form of constraints on
centralized mechanisms) the effects to be explained. At least
one production system model, EPIC (Meyer & Keiras, 1997),
occupies the far extreme of parallelism, accounting for con-
straints on multitasking performance under a variety of con-
ditions entirely in terms of (i.e., as a response to) the conflicts
that arise among shared peripheral processors.
Our models share an obvious similarity with the threaded-
cognition model and, even more so, the EPIC model, as well as
the early multiple-resource theories discussed in the introduc-
tion, in emphasizing the importance of cross-talk among
interacting task-specific pathways as a constraint on multitask-
ing. However, the focus of the production system models has
been largely on the challenges posed by prioritizing and/or
scheduling processes that are in potential conflict, and using
these to account for the details of human multitasking behavior.
Our work might be viewed as complementary to such work,
addressing in a more general way a more proximal issue: the
quantitative relationship betweenmultiplexing, the demands for
control that it poses, and the simultaneous limits that it seems to
impose on the licensing of control. The simple and generic
nature of our models suggests that our observations may rep-
resent general properties of systems involving interacting pro-
cesses, which may be relevant to a broad class of models.
In a separate line of work, neurally inspired models of a
very different flavor from the ones presented here have been
proposed to explain capacity limits in working memory sys-
tems—that is, in the number of representations that can be
actively maintained (e.g., Haarmann & Usher, 2001; Ma &
Huang, 2009; Todd, Niv, & Cohen, 2009; see also Oberauer &
Kliegl, 2006). These may be relevant to limits in the capacity
for control-dependent processing, insofar as most models of
controlled processing (whether neurally inspired or more
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abstract) assume that this relies on the active maintenance of
control signals, and therefore relies on some component of the
workingmemory system (e.g., on task rules, intentions, and/or
goals; e.g., Anderson, 1983; Cowan, 2001; Engel, 2002; E. K.
Miller & Cohen, 2001). Thus, constraints on the capacity for
active maintenance may also contribute to limits in the capac-
ity for control-dependent processing, and integrating such
models with the work presented here (e.g., introducing attrac-
tor dynamics into the control representations in our model)
represents an interesting and potentially valuable direction for
future research.
Even allowing for the possibility that capacity constraints
are imposed by the characteristics of the control system itself,
the present work provides support for the long-standing idea,
suggested by multiple-resource theories, that the architecture
of the rest of the processing system—over which the control
system must preside—represents an important source of such
constraints. Importantly, it brings this idea into contact with
the growing efforts to consider control from a normative
perspective (Botvinick & Cohen, in press; Dayan, 2007;
Shenhav et al., 2013; Todd et al., 2009). A normative ap-
proach to theory may be particularly relevant to an under-
standing of controlled processing, which can usefully be de-
fined as the set of mechanisms responsible for optimizing
processing in the service of maximizing cumulative reward.
One recent theory (EVC) proposes that, from this perspective,
a critical function of the control system is to estimate the
expected value of candidate control-demanding processes
and specify control signals in a way that maximizes this
quantity (Shenhav et al., 2013). This must take into account
not only the expected benefits from controlled processes, but
also the potential costs associated with their execution. Such
costs include the potential for interference from cross-talk that
arises from simultaneously engaging multiple processes. The
work that we have presented here examined how such costs
can figure into the choice of an optimal control policy, and in
particular how it may favor a policy that restricts the allocation
of control to a limited number of processes. Put simply, it
makes “sense” not to try to do more things than can be done,
since the expected returns for doing so will be low. From this
perspective, our findings are consistent with the EVC theory,
providing a normative account of why the control systemmay
actively choose to limit multitasking.
An important assumption of this account is that
multiplexing is either a predetermined feature of the process-
ing architecture in the brain, or that its benefits outweigh the
costs that they impose on multitasking. Multiplexing would
seem to be a fixed characteristic of at least some parts of the
processing system—for example, the motor system. That is, it
seems reasonable to think that the limited dimensionality of
the motor system, relative to the large space of potential
stimuli to which we can respond, is one factor that imposes
multiplexing (e.g., we don’t have two mouths, one to respond
to the color and the other to the word in the Stroop task).
However, this cannot account for the capacity constraints on
control more generally. Internal processes (such as memory
retrieval, mental imagery, planning, and problem solving) are
not constrained by the dimensionality of the motor system, and
yet clearly exhibit the same strict limitations on multitasking
(i.e., a “single line of thought) as do more overt control-
demanding behaviors. This suggests that if limitations of “in-
ternal multitasking”—like those of overt behaviors—reflect
constraints imposed by multiplexing, then there must be some
intrinsic benefits to the multiplexing of the internal representa-
tions that support such processes. We suggested some of these
in the introduction, such as the efficiency of coding and infer-
ence (Forbus et al., 1995; Hinton et al., 1986). This may also
include learning (e.g., the use of distributed, similarity-based
representations to reduce the state space for reinforcement-
learning mechanisms).7 It will be important, in future work,
to explore the relationship between multiplexing and multi-
tasking, by identifying meaningful objective functions that can
be used to evaluate the worth of multiplexing representations,
and by integrating these with the ones for processing (used to
evaluate multitasking) that we have explored here.
Although more comprehensive normative analysis is clear-
ly an important goal, the findings reported here provide a
strong hint concerning their likely outcome. The interaction
between multiplexing and multitasking that we observed was
heavily asymmetric: Even modest degrees of multiplexing
quickly and strongly diminished the value of multitasking.
This suggests that, in a trade-off between the two, onlymodest
benefits to multiplexing need be present to normatively justify
strong constraints on multitasking.
Finally, it is important to consider whether and how the
work we have presented here aligns with work addressing
related questions in other fields. Concerns about cross-talk
and process scheduling are fundamental to many areas of
engineering (such as computer operating-system design, net-
work communications, and transit systems) and other areas of
the life sciences (e.g., genetic expression and cell migration
during development). Accordingly, these issues have
prompted the development of mathematical tools in control
theory, network topology, and graph-theoretical analysis.
However, these tools and their application have focused either
on optimizing the scheduling of sequential processes or in-
creasing and maintaining the robustness of a complex system
(Carlson & Doyle, 2002). To our knowledge, no theoretical or
applied work has specifically addressed the intersection of
factors relevant to the problem that we have outlined in this
article: the constraints on parallel processing introduced by
7 We thank Mike Mozer for pointing out this possibility, as well as the
potential link that it provides between the account of capacity constraints
explored here and the one concerning the role of working memory in
reinforcement learning proposed by Todd et al. (2009).
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cross-talk from the multiplexing of representations upon
which those processes depend. Because of the nonlinearity
and high dimensionality of the optimization problem, we were
forced to resort to numerical computations. Ideally, we would
like more rigorous, analytic tools for quantifying the con-
straints that multiplexing imposes on multitasking within the
processing architecture of neural systems. In this respect, the
problem that we have posed represents a novel and potentially
interesting future challenge for mathematical analysis.
In summary, we have presented simulations that outline the
constraints on multitasking imposed by the multiplexing of
representations. The latter demands the engagement of control
mechanisms in order to prevent cross-talk. From this perspec-
tive, the very feature of the system that demands control, and
yet contributes to its flexibility—multiplexing—appears at the
same time to limit the number of control-demanding tasks that
can be executed at once. As we discussed above, this is likely
to interact with other features of controlled processing, which
together may explain the remarkable limits observed in the
human ability for multitasking. To date, research efforts in this
area have reflected a level of parallel multitasking that appears
unbound by any constraints on control. Hopefully this has
begun to produce insights that, with more interactive efforts in
the future, will lead to a more complete and coherent under-
standing of limitations in the performance of control-
demanding behaviors in humans—behaviors that are other-
wise some of the most flexible, powerful, and characteristic of
those exhibited by humans.
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